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Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously

In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized
brigandage?
St. Augustine1
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part,
that private property shall not “be taken for public use without just
compensation.” This is the so-called “Takings Clause,” and, since the
Supreme Court’s 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it has
served as a limitation on government regulatory actions that go “too
far” in restricting the use of property. Defining “how far is too far” is
the central objective of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, but the
Court’s analysis is recognized by all to be (as it is most politely
phrased) “a muddle.”2
Perhaps the most important reason for this “muddle” is the failure
of the Court to articulate a coherent conceptual basis for the Takings
Clause. A variety of themes that have been advanced to describe the
basis of the Takings Clause. For some, the Takings Clause represents
a critical component of personal liberty that bars the government from
interfering with some almost absolute right to property. For others, it
is merely a codification on the government’s authority to appropriate
title through eminent domain.
One important theme arises from the otherwise unremarkable case
of Armstrong v. United States. In that opinion, Justice Black
advanced the dogmatic conclusion that the Takings Clause “was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”3 This conception of the Takings Clause has
been cited in numerous cases since Armstrong. In Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, for
example, Justice Stevens devoted much of his opinion to an analysis
of whether principles of “justice and fairness” justified temporary
restrictions on construction under the Takings Clause.
This conception of “justice and fairness” embodied in Armstrong
1. St. Augustine, The City of God, 88 (Image Press, 1958).
2. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is
Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984)
3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Black’s opinion
refers to “fairness and justice,” but the Supreme Court routinely cites the
proposition as “justice and fairness.” See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Who am I to differ; I go
with “justice and fairness.”
The court has also, in a number of cases since Armstrong, cited to similar
dogmatic language in the 1893 case, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S.,
148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) in which the Court stated that the Fifth
Amendment “prevents the public from loading upon one individual more
than his just share of the burdens of government….” The principle is,
however, generally traced to Armstrong. See William Michael Treanor, The
Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes,
38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1151 (1997);
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raises one of the central concerns of moral philosophy – an issue that
has captured the attention of philosophers from Aristotle to Star
Trek’s Mr. Spock - when do the needs of the many outweigh the needs
of the few?4 In Aristotelian terms, this is the issue of “distributive
justice” or the ethical analysis of the distribution of benefits and
burdens in society.5
An issue of philosophy to academics, this issue of distributive
justice has now been converted by the Court in to an issue of
constitutional law. Although the Supreme Court, since Armstrong,
has described the Takings Clause as reflecting a concern for
distributive justice, it has never explained the historical or legal basis
for this view. Perhaps worse, the Court has not directly addressed the
consequences of incorporating principles of distributive justice into
the Fifth Amendment.
The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the implications of
incorporating a principle of distributive justice into the Fifth
Amendment.6 It begins with an analysis of the origins of Fifth
Amendment regulatory Takings analysis and the basis (or lack of one)
for the inclusion of a principle of distributive justice. Next it briefly
discusses the concept of distributive justice reflected in the Armstrong
principles of “justice and fairness.” Finally, it addresses four key
implications of incorporating a conception of distributive justice into
the takings clause. First, a focus on distributive justice is a move
away from an assessment of government regulation of private
property based on individual “rights.” Second, the traditional takings
factors previously advanced by the Court can be seen in a new way if
analyzed in light of principles of distributive justice. Third, a focus on
distributive justice may open new sources for evaluating takings.
Finally, a concern for distributive justice raises troubling questions
about the legitimacy of decisions grounded, not in history or neutral
principles, but in an unelected judiciary’s views of principles of
justice and fairness. A grounding of the Takings Clause in these
4. See generally Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982).
5. See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
concept of distributive justice. Fairness, at least since Aristotle, has been
seen as involving a number of distinct applications. Thus, distributive
justice can be seen as analytically distinct from retributive and compensatory
justice.
6. The objectives of this essay are thus modest. It is not my intent to
derive a “takings test” based on principles of distributive justice or to
evaluate the outcome of any dispute in those terms. Rather, it is to raise
some of the serious implications that follow from incorporation a principle
of distributive justice into the Takings Clause.
There is a growing literature that on the role of “justice and fairness” in
takings analysis. Perhaps the most influential article in the field is Professor
Michelman’s classic, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation, 80 Harv. L.Rev. 1165 (1967).
Other scholars have taken up the challenge of interpreting the requirements
of the Takings Clause in light of the Supreme Court’s reference to “justice
and fairness.” See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85
Va. L.Rev. 741 (1999); Treanor, supra note 3; Leigh Raymond, Comment,
The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, and Justice, 23 Ecology L.Q.
577 (1996).
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ethical principles may suggest an extremely limited role for the Court
in finding a regulatory taking.
I. SEARCHING FOR THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE: HISTORY, POWER AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Although many see the Takings Clause as a central statement of
fundamental liberty, the Takings Clause has two dirty little secrets.
First, there is virtually no historical evidence on the intent that lay
behind the adoption of the Taking Clause in the Fifth Amendment.
Second, it was not until 1922 that the Supreme Court, in what was an
extraordinary act of judicial activism, claimed that the Takings Clause
acted to limit government regulatory authority.
A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Although there were ideas current in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries (and contemporaneous land use regulation by States) that
might inform an interpretation of the Takings Clause, there is almost
no direct evidence of the intent of those who actually proposed and
adopted the Takings Clause.7 The Bill of Rights was adopted by
Congress in 1789 and subsequently ratified by the States.8 Many of
the provisions in the Bill of Rights arose from petitions submitted by
the states, but this was not the case with the Takings Clause. The
Takings Clause stands alone as the only part of the Bill of Rights that
was not requested by a single state.9
Madison’s first draft of what became the Takings Clause stated that
a person could not “be obligated to relinquish his property, where it
may be necessary for public use, without just compensation.”10 This
draft was later revised, without explanation, into its current version by
7. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Northwestern U. L.Rev. 1099
(2000); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. L.Rev. 1252 (1996); William Michael Treanor,
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985).
Perhaps the best exchange on the role of history in evaluating takings
claims arose between Justices Scalia and Blackmun in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In his majority opinion,
Justice Scalia finds that the Taking Clause is grounded in some, presumably
Lockean, “historical compact.” Id. At 1028. Justice Blackmun in dissent
describes the lack of historical basis for the majority’s view. Id. at 1056.
Scalia, in a footnote rebuttal, disputes the relevance of the historical record.
Id. at 1028 n. 15. Blackmun, getting in the last word, writes: “I cannot
imagine where the Court finds its ‘historical compact,’ if not in history.” Id.
at 1060 n. 26.
8. Actually, Congress adopted twelve amendments as part of the Bill of
Rights; only ten were subsequently ratified by States.
9. See E. Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 16163 (1957).
10. See The Complete Bill of Rights: the drafts, debates, sources, and
origins 361 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1997); Treanor, supra note 7 at 708-712
(discussion of the history of the adoption of the Takings Clause and
discussion of Madison’s views).
4

Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously

a Committee of the House of Representatives. In the reported debate
on the proposed Bill of Rights in the House and Senate, there is no
reference to the Takings Clause.11 Certainly the Takings Clause did
not reflect an eighteenth century view that the government could not
regulate land without providing compensation; scholars have pointed
to numerous practices of the states at the time of adoption of the Bill
of Rights that involved substantial government regulation of land use
without compensation.12
In short, there is no contemporaneous evidence that the people who
drafted or adopted the Takings Clause cast the provision as a central
protection of government regulation of private property.13 Even more
certainly, there is no evidence that the Takings Clause “was designed”
to incorporate principles of distributive justice. This, of course, does
not mean that the Takings Clause cannot fill that role; it does,
however, raise real questions as to whether the “original intent” of its
drafters supports a specific view of the meaning or purpose of the
Takings Clause.
B. HOLMES, PENNSYLVANIA COAL, AND A JUDICIAL POWER GRAB
The Takings Clause was the subject of relatively little attention until
the pivotal Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in
1922.14 Pennsylvania Coal involved a challenge by coal companies to
a Pennsylvania statute that required coal companies engaged in
subsurface mining to leave pillars of coal in place to support the
surface from subsidence. Justice Holmes, in a short but seminal
opinion, held that the statute violated the Takings Clause. The
Supreme Court, for the first time, announced the crucial proposition
that a regulation may violate the Takings Clause even if it does not
effect a physical appropriation of property. As Holmes stated: “The
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”15
11. See Cogan, supra note 10 at 375.
12. See Hart, supra note 7.
13. This has not prevented some from finding a specific intent underlying
the Takings Clause in certain ideas current at the time of adoption of the Bill
of Rights. Thus, Richard Epstein would define the purposes of the Takings
Clause in his particular reading of John Locke. See Richard Epstein,
Takings: Private Property and Eminent Domain (1985). In Epstein’s view,
only “reciprocity of advantage” would justify a government regulation that
seemed to diminish the value of property. In other words, Epstein would
interpret the Takings Clause to prohibit redistributive goals of government.
Douglas Kmiec would find a definite meaning in the Takings Clause arising
from Blackstone’s views on the absolute nature of property. In Dean
Kmiec’s views, government regulation that diminishes value is limited to
those expectations of property ownership, defined by common law views of
nuisance, that underlay some eighteenth century commentator’s views of
property ownership. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of
the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630
(1988)
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
15. Id. at 415.
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To be sure there is an obvious logic to the proposition. Being
precluded from making use of your property may have the same effect
as having title actually taken by the government. But besides the
“obvious,” on what did Holmes rely for this groundbreaking
proposition?16 The answer is nothing. Holmes cites to no support for
this position other than the self-evident logic. Whatever its “obvious”
logic and appeal, the expansion of the Takings Clause to cover
regulatory acts by the government was a tremendous shift from the
Court’s past treatment of the Takings Clause.17 It was, and is, an
extraordinary assertion of the judiciary’s authority to invalidate
otherwise validly adopted government regulation based on a court’s
view of whether the regulation goes “too far.” Few opinions of the
Supreme Court have resulted in so great a usurpation of authority by
the judiciary with so little support.
Holmes sketched out a variety of factors that he viewed as relevant
to determining “how far” is “too far” for purposes of determining
whether a regulation constitutes a taking of private property. I will
discuss some of those below, but the crucial first step was the equation
of regulation with a taking. Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has
identified a limited class of “per se” takings, but the major theme of
Supreme Court takings analysis has been an “ad hoc” balancing of
factors whose basis have largely been unexamined and unexplained.18
C. ARMSTRONG, FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
In 1960, the Supreme Court announced what was a new and
distinctive statement of the purpose of the Takings Clause. In
Armstrong v. United States,19 Justice Black made the following
assertion about “the” purpose of the Takings Clause. According to
Black:
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in20all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.
There is much to be said for this view of the Takings Clause, but what
16. That is, in fact, the basis for Holmes’ opinion; he states that
“obviously” government regulatory must have some limits. Id.
17. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014
(1992), Justice Scalia acknowledged that prior to Pennsylvania Coal the
Takings Clause had been limited in application to situations of direct
appropriation of private property.
18
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 545 U.S. 528 (2005) for a discussion
of the Court’s existing approach to evaluating regulatory takings. See infra
notes for a discussion of the factors generally identified by the Court as
relevant in an “ad hoc” balance.
19. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
20. Id. at 49.
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cannot be said is that it is founded in history or precedent. What
source does Justice Black rely on for his statement about the purpose
of the Takings Clause? Black cites the same source as Justice Holmes
in Pennsylvania Coal – nothing.21 Although this view of the Fifth
Amendment has been repeated many times by the Court,22 it is
generally supported by a citation to Black’s statement in Armstrong.
Nothing in the history of the adoption of the Takings Clause, of
course, directly supports this position, and the Supreme Court has
done nothing since Armstrong to justify its legitimacy.
Content to cite Black’s statement of the Takings Clause, the
Supreme Court has never seriously explored the implications of
viewing the Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice. Indeed,
the Court seems to have shied away from any serious analysis. In
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,23 Justice O’Connor, noted that
[t]he concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly,
we have eschewed ‘any “set formula” for determining when
“justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by
public action by compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. The
outcome instead ‘depends
largely “upon the particular
circumstances [in that] case.24
In essence, in assessing “justice and fairness” the Court has resorted to
the same ad hoc balancing that has been the court’s traditional
approach to the Takings Clause since Pennsylvania Coal.
This was certainly the approach the Court adopted in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.25 Justice
Stevens’ majority opinion purported to address directly whether
principles of “justice and fairness” would themselves support a
categorical rule that development moratoria constituted a Fifth
Amendment Taking. In rejecting such a categorical rule, Justice
Stevens again essentially equated the application of principles of
“justice and fairness” to the case-by-case balancing approach
conventionally employed by the Court in takings cases. Although
Justice Stevens assessed traditional factors in his analysis, there was
nothing which applied those factors in any way that uniquely
evaluated the distributional justice issues raised by the Armstrong
principles.26
21. Justice Black does provide a “cf.” to Thibodo v. United States, 187
F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951). This Ninth Circuit case, of no particular ethical
pedigree, involved a rather technical discussion of whether a bond holder
could recover principal and interest when the government condemned land
securing the bond.
22. The Supreme Court, by my Westlaw search, has cited to this
statement in Armstrong 16 times since 1960.
23. 533 U.S. 606 (2001)
24. Id. at 633 (citations omitted).
25. 535 U.S. 203 (2002).
26
The statement, and its logic, was applied with perhaps the greatest force
7
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If, however, the Court is going to ground Takings analysis in
conceptions of “justice and fairness” it is time to confront the
implications of this approach.
III. PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The concept of distributive justice has, at its core, a concern with
the fair distribution of resources among members of society. It
involves basic questions relating to the justifications for resolving
competing claims to finite resources. What is a just distribution and
what are the qualities that entitle an individual to claim a just share?
It also involves, in the words of the Armstrong Principle, a concern
for deciding when costs can be imposed on a few and when “in justice
and fairness” such costs should be born by the public as a whole.
Evaluation of the concept of distributive justice has been a basic
part of Western ethical thinking for over three thousands of years.
Aristotle’s writings in the Nichomacean Ethics are still central to
discussions in this area. Enlightenment philosophers, especially
David Hume, have described fundamental principles that govern an
evaluation of distributive justice. Over the last fifty years, much of
the academic literature has focused on economic and game theoretic
approaches to evaluation of distributive justice. John Rawls’ work on
evaluation of the fairness of institutions and the role of impartiality
has become a basic part of any discussion of distributive justice. The
literature on distributive justice is enormous and can be
extraordinarily technical.
As with most areas of ethics, the literature produces many questions
but few answers. General consensus on a number of fundamental
principles does exist, however, and these principles guide the search
for theories of distributive justice.
A. PREMISES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
One concept stands at the center of an evaluation of distributive
justice; it is the concept of equality. At least since Aristotle, the basic
tenet of distributive justice is the requirement of equality of treatment
of individuals. To paraphrase Aristotle, distributive justice involves
treating “like things, in a like manner.”27 According to Amartya Sen,
all theories of distributive justice involve a requirement of equality;
by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Penn Central Transportation v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In that case, the majority upheld a New
York City historic preservation law that limited plans for a major alteration
of Penn Station. Rehnquist noted that the owners of Penn Central were
being singled out because the building was built too well, and Rehnquist,
relying in part on Black’s statement in Armstrong, would have held the
requirement a taking since it unfairly singled out the property owner to bear
the cost of a public benefit.
27. See Aristotle,Politics, Everyman Ed., Warrington trans., at pg. 80-81;
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.3. 1131a10-b15.
8
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theories vary only with respect to what quality is to be equalized
among people – the “equalisandum.”.28 This requirement for equality
of treatment is generally known as the “formal principle of justice.”
Despite this focus on equality, distributive justice does not require
that people be treated equally, only that differences in treatment are
justifiable on grounds relevant to the distinction.29 As Aristotle noted:
equals are entitled to equal things. But here we are met with an
important question:
Equals and unequals in what? That is the
difficult question.30
Difficult question indeed.
In contrast to the “formal principle of justice” that requires the
equal treatment of equals, the “material principles of justice” define
the criteria that justify differing treatment of individuals. Under
varying theories, distributive justice is satisfied if differences are
justified under appropriate material principles of justice. Thus, as
discussed below, if “merit” is viewed as the appropriate material
principle of justice, persons who work harder or produce more may be
entitled to a greater share of a finite resource. If “need” is the
appropriate material principle, a view of “from each according to his
ability, to each according to his need” may be justified. Identification
of appropriate “material principles” is perhaps the central debate in
analysis of distributive justice.
In most ethical theories, virtues and a Kantian set of morally
compelled behaviors exist independent of the society in which they
are evaluated. Thus, benevolence towards others may be a virtue that
is independent the social institutions of a culture. In contrast, many
philosophers view distributive justice as constituting a virtue that can
only be assessed or identified in a social context.31 As such, one
cannot determine what is “just” outside the context of the institutions
of society, and one cannot say what an individual is “due” under
principle of distributive justice without regard to such institutions.
Thus, the obligations of distributive justice are not defined ex-ante,
but arise from the institutions that establish relationships and claims
within a society. Putting it simply, there may not be one morally
28. Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined ? (1992).
29. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines distributive justice as
principles specifying the just distribution of benefits and burdens:
the outcome in which everyone receives their due. A common
basis is that persons should be treated equally unless reasons for
inequality exist: after that the problems include the kind of
reasons that justify departing from equality, the role of the state
in rectifying inequality, the link between a distributive system
and the maximization of well-being.
Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1996)(def. of “justice,
distributive”)
30.Aristotle,Politics, 80-81 (Everyman Ed., Warrington trans.).
31 Indeed, David Hume described justice an “artificial virtue,”See David
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
9

Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously

correct answer to the obligations of distributive justice that can be
identified through traditional ethical appeal to deontological
obligations or moral intuition.
B. THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
With these principles as a predicate, a variety of theories of
distributive justice have been proposed to “solve” the question of how
finite resources are to be “justly” allocated within society. These
theories have been organized in a variety of ways that highlight
certain common qualities of the theories. No particular classification
perfectly captures the relationships among the differing theories, but
they do help to focus on important elements. The following taxonomy
focuses on several factors and highlights specific approaches
associated with these theories.
1. Maximization of Social Utility
Perhaps the most coherent and well explored theory of distributive
justice is one which holds that resources should be divided to secure
the greatest overall utility to society as a whole. - in other words,
utilitarianism. The philosopher most associated with a strict utilitarian
theory of justice is, of course, Jeremy Bentham. There are recurring
issues with application of a Benthamite utilitarian approach. What is
the nature of the “utility” that is being maximized? How do you
assess the individual utilities that are to be maximized? Yet, at its
core, utilitarianism is based on a simple concept – there is a moral
goal of maximizing the overall extent of satisfaction in society.32
It would seem curious to claim utilitarianism as a credible theory of
distributive justice.
One of the fundamental criticisms of
utilitarianism is that the principle is blind to concerns for the
distribution of utility within society.33 Certainly, the theory allows the
unequal imposition of costs on some so long as the overall utility of
society is furthered. Nonetheless, utilitarianism in some form has
been a central component of “welfare-based” analysis of distributive
concerns.34 Something like utilitarianism has been analyzed in more
traditional ethical modes. John Harsanyi, for example, has approached
32. Although in some respects it seems to glorify a conception of
efficiency as the goal of justice and fairness, utilitarianism clearly is
premised on two compelling ethical principles. First, each individual speaks
with an equal voice in calculating overall efficiency. Although different
people have differing assessments of utility, each person’s assessment is
entitled to the same weight. In some sense, utilitarianism contains elements
of autonomy, or respect for individual capacities, and impartiality in the
sense of equal moral standing for each individual. Second, utilitarianism is
fundamentally grounded a virtue of benevolence. The furthering of the wellbeing of humans is itself a moral goal that forms the core of judgments about
moral actions.
33. See, e.g., William K. Frankena, Ethics (2d ed. 1973); Steven Kelman,
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, Regulation, January-February
1981 at 33.
34 See, e.g., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Distributive Justice,”
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/.
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the issue of distributive justice in a way that eliminates the bias of
unearned differences in individual capacity.35 In other words,
distributive justice is to be assessed not from the perspective of the cla
ims of actual individuals, but rather from an “impartial” perspective
that identifies justifiable moral claims independent of the identity of
an existing claimant. This approach involves application of a form of
a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” Harsanyi’s conclusion leads to a rule
that maximizes the average utility of all members of society. In other
words, if you don’t know which role you will be assigned in society,
the best rule of allocation for you to choose is one which maximizes
the average utility of everyone. This is a conclusion that is essentially
equivalent to utilitarianism.
At one time, the Supreme Court flirted with the idea of some
concept of efficiency as a measure of the Takings Clause. The Court
suggested that a regulation could not be a Taking if it “substantially
advanced legitimate state interests.” In Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A.,
however, the Court recently rejected this formulation. The court
concluded that a Takings assessment based on efficiency and
rationality was inappropriate since a test that does not consider how a
“burden is allocated cannot tell us when justice might require that the
burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment of
compensation.”36
The Court’s conclusion is certainly appropriate and consistent with
some criticisms of the distributive implications of utilitarianism. The
Court’s conclusion is not, however, compelled. This is not to suggest
that utilitarianism is the correct or even a compelling principle of
distributive justice. It is to suggest that a utilitarian approach cannot
be dismissed from the class of possible, legitimate ethical principles of
distributive justice.
2. Maximization of Individual Utilities
Other approaches to distributive judgment involve an assessment of
the individual utilities of competing claimants. In contrast to a classic
utilitarian approach which uses individual utility solely to calculate
the sum of total social utility, these approaches try to define rules
which fairly satisfy the individual objectives of the claimants. In
effect, they attempt to define “fair” solutions to the problem of
division of a finite resource that can be said to fairly satisfy the
individual utility objectives of the competing actors.37 These
35. See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory. 69 American Political Science
Review 594-606 (1975).
36. 545 U.S. at 543.
37. See generally Brian M. Barry, Theories of Justice (1989). The
original insights for this area developed from the work of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern. Applying game theory principles to a fair division problem
between two persons, the goal was to use information about the preferences
of the two parties to determine some “best” allocation of a finite resource.
Since these approaches rely on an assumption that a fair allocation will be in
11
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approaches generally lead into the complex and highly mathematical
area of game theory and bargaining solutions. The work of John
Nash, for example, has led to a series of Nash Bargaining Solutions to
fair division problems. These types of analysis fall in the domain of
mathematicians and economists, and pity the poor lawyers and judges
who might need to understand these concepts.
Reference to game theory, in fact, leads to the fundamental question
- what does this have to do with an ethical issue of distributive justice?
There is a well recognized disconnect between the language and
methodology of game theory approaches and a more traditional
philosophical approach to the ethics of distributive justice.38
Nonetheless, these approaches do have standing as moral theories. As
noted above, an axiom of distributive justice, from Aristotle to Sen, is
the goal of providing “equality” of treatment. In an important sense,
these game theory approached define the object of equality as
individual utility. This is a conceptually strong basis for a fair or
justice allocation; it is simply not the only basis as will be discussed
below.
Even if viewed as a form of ethical analysis of distributive justice,
these game theory approaches have deep analytical problems that may
prevent their application as a solution to Takings issues. First, these
approaches, relying as they do on a principle of equality of individual
utility, ignore other possible principles that might be defensible in
assessment of a fair distribution. As will be discussed below,
principles of “blameworthiness” or “need” are traditionally advocated
as appropriate criteria. Viewed in this way, Nash Bargaining
Solutions and indeed most game theory approaches do not solve the
problem of fair division; they simply define an approach to calculating
the solution to one, among many possible, approaches to the definition
of distributive justice.39 These approaches are not wrong; they simply
the best interest of both parties, any fair allocation must provide that no party
is worse off after the allocation than the party was before. In such a case,
both parties have an incentive to vary the initial allocation: one or both will
be better off and neither will be worse off.
Given information about the parties’ initial position or “non-agreement
point” and their relative preferences for the outcome, certain game theoretic
approaches can provide a series of possible outcomes that defined a range of
allocations that would improve the position of one or both parties. Each of
these different outcomes represented an allocation in which it was not
possible to improve the utility of one party without decreasing the utility of
the other – the pareto frontier. They could not, however, produce a single or
“unique” solution to a two player fair division problem. A series of
approaches stemming from the work of John Nash have provided solutions
that purport to define a unique solution to a two player bargaining problem.
These all, in one way or another, can be characterized as among a class of
“Nash Bargaining Solutions.”
38. See John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (1996).
39. It is possible to argue that, although additional factors may be
appropriate in assessing the fairness and justice of division, any allocation
that satisfies, for example, some form of Nash Bargaining Solution also
satisfies minimum conceptions of fairness. In other words, any solution that
provides an equivalent division of individual utility presumptively satisfies a
sense of fair or just allocation unless “trumped” by some other principle of
12
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have no more moral standing than other approaches in consideration
of fair division.
More significantly, a fundamental problem arises from a basic
premise of these approaches. All require definition of a “nonagreement” point that specifies the amount of the resource that the
parties will receive in the absence of further allocation.40
Identification of the non-agreement point is critical to define the range
of possible outcomes. No solution which makes a claimant worse off
is permissible since that party has not incentive to move from the
status quo.
The very purpose of the Takings analysis, however, is to define the
circumstances in which a party who currently owns property should
be compensated when there is some reallocation of value from the
owner to society as a whole. If the non-agreement point is defined as
absolute ownership, then there may be no bargaining solution that
does not require compensation since no rational landowner makes that
bargain. If, however, existing property rights are not absolute, but are
limited by legitimate government regulation, then some range of
uncompensated “Takings” are possible as a “fair” distribution.
Indeed, the definition of the non-agreement point is, in many ways,
the basic question of distributive justice in the context of a Takings
analysis. Since game theoretic approaches require the definition of a
“non-agreement” point (and predict the implications that arise from a
given non-agreement point), but they beg the fundamental questions
raised by the Takings issue. Some other principle or principles of
distributive justice must be invoked to resolve this question.
3. Justifiable Inequality
Although distributive justice is premised on a goal of equality of
treatment, in many ways the goal is not to define the elements of
equality; rather the goal is to define the elements that justify unequal
treatment among individuals. In other words, distributive justice
requires equal treatment of all individuals unless there is a “material
principle” that justifies different and unequal treatment. A search for
justifiable principles of inequality leads to a vast set of proposals in
the history of moral philosophy. In these approaches, the key
component of distributive justice is the moral justification that is made
for any specific material principle of justice. Obviously, there is no
consensus on any one approach to define universally acceptable
principles.
One historically significant material principle of justice is an
allocation based on “need;” the factor that justifies different treatment
of people is their varying levels of need. With need as the principle of
justice, a redistribution of wealth from “haves” to “have nots” is just.
distributive justice. A solution which does not constitute a Nash Bargaining
Solution might be presumptively unfair unless justified by some other
principle.
40. See supra note 37.
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Although having a familiar Marxist flavor, some view of fairness and
justice as not only authorizing but compelling special treatment for the
needy has a strong ethical pedigree.
Other views of justice justify the different treatment of individuals
based on “merit” or “desert.” In other words, individuals through
their effort or other morally commendable behavior are entitled to a
greater share of resources. In contrast to a theory of merit that justifies
a reward for morally praiseworthy or productive effort, it is a
relatively uncontroversial proposition that a principle of distributive
justice allows for the different treatment of individual’s who engage in
morally blameworthy conduct. Thus, few theories of distributive
justice would preclude a reallocation of an existing resource from an
individual that acquired the resource through theft or by violation of
some other socially proscribed conduct such as cheating or even
monopolistic behavior. The goal of a theory of distributive justice
that relies on a criterion of blameworthiness is to define that class of
“bad” behavior that justifies redistribution. As discussed below, this
issue is implicit in much of the Court’s search for Takings criteria.
4. Impartiality and Process
Other approaches to distributive justice invoke a conception of
impartiality in assessing the justice of the distribution of resources in
society. The goal of this approach is to define the elements of social
institutions that result in a fair distribution of resources in a manner
that is neutral or impartial with respect to any individual’s class or
status role in society. The focus of this approach is not on the
outcome of the distribution, but on the process and rules that decide
the allocation.41
Several premises underlie much of this thinking. First, distributive
justice is implemented through social institutions, and it is the fairness
of institutions, not the fairness of individual determinations or
allocations, that should be the focus of justice concerns. Second,
individuals have no moral claim to their individual capacity or status
in society (i.e., intelligence, strength, inherited status) and fairness
therefore requires a distributive scheme that does not depend on
allocation based on capacity. This does not mean that just institutions
cannot make distinctions based on these capacities, but it does mean
that the justness of the institutions themselves must be assessed in a
manner that is impartial and not biased to further the ends of any
particular class or status. Third, to the extent distributive justice is
premised on self-interest, and just social institutions are to be assessed
41 Robert Nozick, for example, would distringuish between patterned and
unpatterned conceptions of distributionive justice. Patterned conceptions
judge the fairness of an allocation by whether there is, at a given point in
time, a “just” distribution of resources in society. Unpatterned conceptions,
in contrast, focus not on the outcome, but on the rules of allocation. In
Nozick’s view, a given distribution of resources is not subject to criticism on
distributive justice grounds if the initial allocation was fair and the rules of
subsequent transfer among individuals are fair. See Robert Nozick,
Anarchy, State and Utopia (1975).
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based on the extent to which they satisfy the self-interest of an
impartial participant.
Evaluating distributive justice through a lens of impartiality has
both strength and weaknesses in the Takings context. A focus on
social institutions rather than specific outcomes clearly has
advantages. If social institutions are designed in a way that is
perceived to result in distributive justice, the role of the courts would
focus on ensuring the proper operation of the institution rather than an
assessment of the outcome. Further, it has an appealing approach to
the problem of equality by seeking to define institutions that are
equally fair and equally acceptable to all elements of society since, in
this approach, institutions must be assessed based on the possibility
that any individual might occupy any position in society.
Distributive justice as impartiality has, however, obvious flaws as a
tool for practical application. Unlike claims of game theory, it defines
an approach rather than a unique solution to distributive justice
questions. Further, to the extent that elements such as a Rawlsian
“difference principle” rely not on impartial self-interest, but on a
moral concern that justifies redistributive policies, this approach
requires application of a material principle other than impartiality.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AS A
PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
If the Takings Clause is seen as embodying a principle of
distributive justice, then it is time for the Supreme Court seriously to
consider the implications that follow from this view. This is not an
idle academic exercise; much is at stake in terms of the limits on
government authority and the perception of legitimacy of the Court’s
approach.
One thing certainly does not follow from this view. Application of
the Takings Clause does not become simpler or clearer; no bright line
test emerges to replace the current muddle. As Justice O’Connor has
noted, principles of “justice and fairness” are less than “fully
determinate.”42 The Supreme Court’s goal, if distributive justice is to
be taken seriously, should be to articulate the factors that justify the
imposition of regulatory costs on a limited group of people.43
42. 533 U.S. at 633.
43. Obviously, this is a search for principles grounded in “justice and
fairness.” Citing language from Armstrong, Dean Kmiec states that “[t]he
straightforward purpose of the Takings Clause is to avoid the
disproportionate placement of public burdens upon a single property owner.”
Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings
Puzzle, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 996 (1997). This statement, however,
seriously mischaracterizes the Armstrong principle of distributive justice
under which an action would be a taking if it “unfairly” or “unjustly”
imposed a burden. “Disproportionate” burdens fail a test of distributive
justice only if you view “proportion” as the appropriate principle of justice.
If “disproportionate” is merely means that a Taking results when the
distribution fails a test of “fairness” under some other material principle,
then it is simply a tautology.
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A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
One of the great challenges to conceptions of distributive justice is
to reconcile concerns for justice with claims of individual rights. If
distributive justice focuses on the “fair” and “equal” resolution of
competing claims by individuals, a focus on individual rights has, as a
central quality, a claim that such rights cannot be sacrificed to further
a general social value. In Ronald Dworkin’s phrase, rights are
‘trump” that cannot be required to yield to a general utilitarian
concern with social utility.44 If, as discussed below, utilitarianism
represents one valid theory of distributive justice, concerns for
individual rights and distributive justice may, in certain
circumstances, be in conflict.
Although not all theories of distributive justice create an inevitable
conflict, the language of distributive justice and individual rights is
clearly different. Rights language asks what fundamental claims can
an individual make on society. In contrast, distributive justice asks
how access to limited resources is to be allocated within society.
Justice and fairness, in distributive justice terms, implies the
possibility of trade-offs and compromise to satisfy the legitimate
claims of competing individuals. Analyses based on individual rights
have a quality of absolutism that is contrary to an approach of
compromise and allocation. Rights have a Kantian or deontological
quality while distributive justice, in Hume’s term, is an artificial virtue
tied to particular social institutions.
Thus, a shift in Fifth Amendment Takings analysis from a focus on
property rights to a concern for the “justice and fairness” of the
allocation of costs of social programs is a major, if subtle, shift in a
view of the purpose of the Takings Clause
B. REASSESSING TAKINGS FACTORS IN LIGHT OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
Although the Court has generally failed expressly to evaluate its
balancing factors in terms of distributive justice, most factors appear
to have a rough relevance to a consideration of fairness. Much like
Moliere’s Monsieur Jourdain, the Supreme Court may have been
speaking “fairness and justice” for forty years without knowing it. A
sharper focus on the implication of these factors to issues of
distributive justice will, however, likely alter the way they are
evaluated and suggest others that might be relevant.
1. Reciprocity of Advantage
At least since Pennsylvania Coal the Supreme Court has recognized
that “reciprocity of advantage” is relevant in determining whether a
regulation is a taking. Although a regulation may burden me to
benefit another, that same regulation may benefit another to benefit
44.
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me. The issue of reciprocity, in part, addresses the question of loss. It
asks whether the benefits of the regulation to the landowner offset the
burdens; a regulation will not be a taking if the landowner receives
sufficient benefit to require no additional compensation. In other
words: no harm, no foul.
This concept of “reciprocity of advantage” is clearly relevant to
virtually any assessment of distributive justice. Without loss, it is
hard to say that a person has been unfairly singled out to bear the cost
of regulation.45 In many ways, it is an imperfect application of a
principle of equivalent individual utility, and satisfaction of a
condition of reciprocity of benefits and burdens may define one class
of regulations that do not require compensation. Regulations that do
not provide reciprocity of advantage may still be justifiably imposed
without compensation if they satisfy some other principle of
distributive justice. Reciprocity of benefits and burdens is thus a
sufficient but not necessary condition for determining regulations that,
in “justice and fairness,” do not require compensation.
2. Magnitude of Loss
One of the more puzzling factors used by the Court in assessing
takings is the magnitude of the loss suffered by a landowner. The
clear implication of the Court’s pragmatic balancing approach is that
some substantial level of loss must be accepted but that too great a
loss results in a taking. Thus, at least since the crucial zoning case of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty,46 losses of property value of up to 75% may
not constitute a taking. In contrast, the Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission47 held that a 100% loss of value is a
“per se” taking. Forgetting, for the moment, the difficulty of drawing
the line where a loss of value becomes “too great,” the Court has
never clearly articulated why some substantial loss does not require
compensation while somewhat more loss does.
The answer may lie in terms of distributive justice. If we view most
regulations as resulting in a roughly fair distribution of benefits and
burdens over time (a form of “temporal” reciprocity of advantage),
significant short-term burdens (although ultimately compensated
through general social regulation) may still be viewed as unfair. Thus,
in fairness terms, the issue of the magnitude of loss is relevant to
determining whether a landowner has suffered a burden that is not
only disproportionate over the short-term but also of such a magnitude
that it is unfair to require a landowner to bear it at any time.
45. Although phrased in terms of “reciprocity of advantage” the principle
surely cannot focus simply on the equality of benefits among affected
landowners. Is distributive justice satisfied if my neighbor and I receive
reciprocal benefits from a regulation although the regulation imposes a
greater burden on me? The factor of reciprocity should, for purposes of
distributive justice, focus not only on the magnitude and reciprocity of
benefit but also on whether affected parties are all treated with some rough
equality in terms of both benefits and burdens.
46. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
47. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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But again the issue is “how much is too much”? Perhaps, the anser
lies in a utilitarian assessment of efficiency as reflected in insurance
theory. Insurance involves the sharing of risk with others to minimize
loss, but, in most economic views, insurance is appropriately
employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and
unpredictable events. Insurance theory indicates that we should not
buy insurance to cover relatively small losses that arise from the
regular and expected events; it is economically more rational to bear
such losses ourselves. I am reasonably sure that there are nice
formulas developed by economists that indicate the economically
rational situations in which risks should be spread through insurance.
Perhaps the Takings Clause can be seen, in part, as a form of social
insurance that requires compensation for catastrophic loss through
regulation. Through taxes we pay the premiums for protection against
such catastrophic loss, but we bear the costs of routine regulatory loss
ourselves. In this view “temporal reciprocity” justifies the fairness of
routine regulation and the “social insurance” aspect mitigates the
unfairness of a loss of beyond a certain magnitude.
3. Blameworthy Conduct
A factor that has dogged the Supreme Court’s takings analysis has
been the relevance of “blameworthiness” in assessing a taking. Is a
regulation less likely to be a taking if it prohibits blameworthy
conduct of the affected landowner? Is a regulation more likely to be a
taking if it regulates otherwise benign conduct? It would be hard to
dispute that the moral blameworthiness of the burdened landowner
would be relevant in assessing the distributive justice of a regulation.
No one complains that landowners have lost value because they are
prohibited from selling heroin or dumping nuclear waste on their
property.
The problem arises in how to characterize “blameworthiness.” One
strange line of thinking suggested by the Court can be seen as the
“two sided coin” approach. In this view, forcing a landowner to
confer a public benefit is equivalent (the flip side of the coin) to
preventing the harm of losing the benefit. This was, in part, the logic
employed by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.48 In Penn Central, the Court upheld a New York
landmark preservation ordinance that limited the development of an
historic building. Altering Penn Station may be an aesthetic disaster,
but it is harder to make the case that the owner of a building
considered important to the public is morally blameworthy for
developing the building in the same manner available to the owners of
less important buildings. Nonetheless, part of the Supreme Court’s
analysis was premised on the view that altering the building was, in
some sense, equivalent to harm-inflicting acts that are the more
traditional target of government regulation.
48. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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In contrast, others have suggested a view premised on an analysis of
common law rules of nuisance. Although the Supreme Court has
never gone this far, some have advocated a view that nuisance, the
historic common law approach to regulating “unreasonable” uses of
land, serves to define the limits of uncompensated government
takings.49 In this view, the government would be free to regulate
nuisance-like behavior, but the Takings Clause would require
compensation when the government regulated conduct that did not
constitute a common law nuisance. In part, this view is premised on
the view that one can have no legitimate expectation of a property
interest in conducting nuisance like activity. It also, however, seems
to reflect a view that nuisance like activity is also “blameworthy” and
thus not entitled to compensation. Conceptions of nuisance that focus
on efficiency concerns in reconciling two legitimate but competing
uses, however, suggest that an evaluation of moral blameworthiness is
not equivalent to an assessment of nuisance.
Thus, the issue of “blameworthiness” cannot be resolved either by
sophistry or common law rules of land use. The issue, as focused by a
concern for distributive justice, may more properly address whether
the conduct of the affected landowner is such that it is appropriate to
impose the onus of uncompensated regulation to address the
consequence of the behavior.50
4. Investment-Backed Expectations
The Supreme Court has regularly stated that it is relevant for
purposes of a takings analysis if a regulation affects reasonable
“investment-backed expectations.” This concept, first articulated by
the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,51 has been the subject of much debate and more confusion.52
49. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 13. There are hints of this approach In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In
Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a regulation that prohibits a common law
nuisance can never be a taking (in part based on the logic that you can never
be deprived of a property right that you never had). Although this seems
clearly correct, it says nothing about whether a regulation could be a taking
if it regulated other than nuisance-like behavior. In Lucas, the Court
accepted as fact that the land in question had lost all of its value as a result of
a government regulation. The Supreme Court adopted a per se takings rule
that a 100% loss of value will be a taking unless the government was
regulating a traditional common law nuisance. The Court did not resolve the
issue of when a taking will be found where there is less than a 100% loss in
value.
50. Even a focus on the moral “blameworthiness” of conduct raises very
difficult questions. Is destruction of critical habitat of an endangered species
sufficiently blameworthy to justify regulation without compensation?
Destruction of this remaining habitat may only be significant because ninety
percent of the habitat has previously been destroyed by unregulated prior
development. In other words, how is one to claim that uncompensated
regulation is justified based on the blameworthiness of conduct when the
“blameworthy” consequences arise only because the landowner is among the
last to engage in the conduct.
51. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
52. There is general consensus that the Supreme Court has thoroughly
19

Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously

Although recognition of a role for “investment-backed expectations,”
apparently finds it origin in Professor Michelman’s classic, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law,53 the Supreme Court has never been clear about
the relationship of “investment-backed expectations” to questions of
“justice and fairness.”
Surely, however, a landowner’s “expectations” are relevant to an
assessment of the fairness of imposing regulatory burdens. A focus
on “expectations” can reflect a concern with the fairness of imposing
costs on a landowner who has reasonably relied on a state of law.
Certainly, the extent of reliance, perhaps reflected in the concept of
“investment-backed” expectations, is relevant to the fairness of the
allocation of costs.
The challenge is to turn the concept of “investment-backed
expectations” to a focus on criteria of distributive justice. What are
the special qualities of expectation that warrant special treatment of
some landowners as opposed to others? Michelman provided some
answers, but there are certainly others. Again, a concern for
distributive justice does not resolve these questions but may help
sharpen the focus and rationale on the role of expectations in takings
analysis.
5. Selection Process
If distributive justice is concerned with unfairly “singling out” a
person to bear the costs of regulation, one would assume that the
actual process of selection would be relevant in assessing fairness.
Decision-making processes that may repeatedly single out certain
groups to bear regulatory costs would raise distributive justice, and
therefore takings, concerns.
The Supreme Court, however, has only obliquely indicated that a
takings analysis involves a focus on the decision-making process.
There is an odd line of takings cases in which courts have not found a
muddied any coherent basis for a concern for “investment-backed
expectations.” See, e.g., R.S. Radford and J. David Breemer, Great
Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of
Investment-Backed Expectations, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 449 (2001); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 Urb. Law.
215 (1995).
53. Michelman, supra note 6. In his article, Professor Michelman
identified the importance of the role of “justified, investment-backed
expectations”” in evaluating takings claims. See Michelman, supra note 6 at
1213. In part, Michelman focused on a utilitarian component that requires
protection of expectations to promote efficient use of property.
As
Michelman notes, in a utilitarian analysis “security of expectation is
cherished, not for its own sake, but only as a shield for morale.” Id.
Michelman also expressed the view that “the purpose of compensation is to
prevent the special kind of suffering on the part of people who have grounds
for feeling themselves the victim of unprincipled exploitation.” Id. at 1230.
This suggests some deontological obligation to avoid harming others as a
basis for the Taking Clause. Yet utilitarian or deontological concerns for the
protection of expectations do not capture the full set of issues of distributive
justice that warrant protection of certain classes of reasonable expectations.
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taking when the regulation was a result of some natural calamity.
Thus, in the important but odd case of Miller v. Schoene,54 the
Supreme Court found no taking when the owner of cedar trees was
required, in order to prevent the spread of an infectious disease, to
destroy his trees to protect economically more value apple trees.
Conceding the legitimacy of the need to protect the more valuable
apple trees, this hardly provides an explanation of why fairness does
not require compensation of the owner of the cedar trees. Certainly,
the Court failed to provide such an explanation.
Perhaps the answer lies in the issue of process. The owner of the
cedar trees was singled out, not by the potentially manipulated
political process, but rather by the vagaries of disease. In other words,
God, not people, selected the victim. If you have questions about
fairness, take it up with clergy not the courts.
Whether this in fact underlies the courts’ treatment of calamity
cases, the issue of selection process seems relevant to an assessment
of fairness. In line with the calamity cases, a regulation should be less
likely to be seen as a taking when the burden imposed by a regulation
is assigned based on some objective criteria that do not lend
themselves to political manipulation. In this view, Endangered
Species Act or wetlands regulations would not raise heightened
takings concerns if restrictions were imposed based on the qualities of
the land (and its critters) rather than the qualities of the landowner.
C. LOOKING TO SOURCES BEYOND THE LAW
The Supreme Court’s search for factors relevant to a takings
analysis has been long on imagination but short on references. The
academic literature is rich with political and economic analyses of the
takings issue, but this has generally been of little utility to the Court.
It is problematic to rely on political theory and economics when it is
unclear how those relate to the core objectives of the Takings Clause.
A focus on the Takings Clause as a principle of distributive justice
has the potential to open a line of takings analysis based on the
literature of moral philosophy. There is a substantial body of
literature evaluating the concept and application of distributive justice
that could be relevant to a court’s analysis. It might be odd to cite
Aristotle in support of a takings argument before the Supreme Court,
but the inherently extra-legal judgments inherent in distributive justice
may point to reliance on extra-legal sources.
The application of philosophical analysis to law is not, of course,
unknown. John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, among
many others, bring substantial insights from philosophy into the legal
discourse on the Takings Clause. Perhaps the most influential (or at
least cited) law review article on takings, Professor Michelman’s
Property, Utility and Fairness, provides an interesting analysis of

54. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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fairness in the takings context through an application of Rawls.55
Thus, a focus on the Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice
could open the door to a whole body of literature and analysis to
inform the Takings debate. Thus, it may be appropriate to cite
Aristotle as well as Euclid.56
D. LEGITIMACY, JUDGES AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Although a focus on distributive justice may open the door to a
judicial evaluation of philosophical concepts, the question remains as
to whether we want judges to walk through that door. How is one to
assess the legitimacy of a position that requires judge’s to apply their
conceptions of “fairness and justice” in establishing limits on
government power?
This issue raises a number of questions (and one significant
conclusion). The initial question is whether a proposed theory of the
Takings Clause that requires courts to make such indeterminate and
extra-legal judgments fails on that ground alone? In other words, is it
impermissible to interpret the Takings Clause in distributive justice
terms because it requires judges to become involved in philosophical
issues of fairness?
There are several not so simple responses to this concern. First, it is
the Supreme Court itself that has articulated this rationale for the
Takings Clause. It is also a principle that has been cited by a wide
spectrum of views on the Court – from Blackmun to Rehnquist and
Scalia. You can blame them if you do not like this claim of judicial
authority. Second, alternative interpretations of the Takings Clause
involve the courts in applying their value judgments; an express
reliance of distributive justice makes this process more open. Finally,
other aspects of constitutional interpretation, particularly the
development of “substantive due process,” involve the courts in extratextual and arguably extra-judicial limits on government power. Thus,
the intrusion of judges’ values into constitutional interpretation has
some pedigree.
A second question is whether, as an institutional matter, it is proper
to rely on the philosophical views of a narrow, unelected, and
unaccountable group of judges. Since this approach to the Takings
Clause largely eliminates any “neutral” anchoring of takings analysis
in text or history, a concern that the biases and prejudices of judges
will shape takings law is quite real.57 Certainly, concerns for modes
55. Michelman, supra note 6. Michelman’s article relies on an early
version of Rawls’ work and hence fails to consider certain implications of
changes, particularly the “difference principle, that Rawls made to his
theories in a later version of A Theory of Justice.
56. Referring, of course, to City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
57. Addressing this issue, Professor Michelman notes that “[h]owever
difficult the fairness standard may be to formulate and apply, there is no
obvious reason for supposing that political actors should be able to
understand it or handle it more deftly than judges can.” See Michelman,
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of constitutional interpretation that rely on the underlying values of
unelected judges are widely expressed by scholars and judges.58 A
focus on distributional justice has the virtue, at least, of being more,
rather than less, explicit about this aspect of the law.
A third question is whether society would accept takings decisions
premised on judicial views of distributive justice?59 Will individuals
be content to accept restrictions on the use of their property based on
assurances by a court that it is fair? As noted, Rawls’ theory of justice
involves an identification of those social practices and institutions that
disinterested observers, operating behind a “veil of ignorance” as to
their place in society, would agree are fair. This suggests that an
individual could be expected to accept a decision based on the
following logic: “You would think it was fair if you were as smart as I
am.” This is perhaps not the most compelling argument for social
acceptance of imposition of a regulatory burden.
These concerns with the institutional legitimacy of judicially
derived judgments of distributive justice thus suggest perhaps the
most significant consequence of a principle of takings grounded in
“justice and fairness.” Since courts have limited institutional
competence and few neutral criteria to apply in making distributive
justice decisions, judges should be extremely chary of substituting
their views of fairness for legislative judgments. In other words, the
Takings Clause should have limited force except in the most extreme
cases. This is not an abandonment of the principle of distributive
justice, but it is a recognition that such judgments are better left to
elected and socially responsive legislatures rather than courts.
This seems to be exactly the position taken by the Supreme Court in
the area of substantive due process and the regulation of land use.
Although the Court has recognized the possibility of invalidating
legislative acts on due process grounds, it has largely chosen not to
exercise such power except in defined areas of fundamental rights.60
supra note 6 at 1248.
58. Concerns range the spectrum from “legal realists,” such as Karl
Llewellyn, to Scalia’s criticism of the Court’s analysis in abortion decisions.
See, e.g.,Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
984 (Scalia, dissenting). For some, however, moral readings are at the heart
of a process of interpretation of fundamental liberties in the Constitution.
See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution (1996).
It is certainly not my intent here to delve in the murky waters of
constitutional interpretation and post-modern critiques of the nature of the
judicial process. Suffice it to say that an express reliance on principles of
distributive justice clearly highlights the amorphous and untethered basis of
judicial review of Takings.
59. The question of the legitimacy of courts in a democratic society raises
its own set of concerns. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(1980); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991).
60. Thus concepts of substantive due process, hinted at by the Supreme
Court in City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), have largely disappeared from
federal constitutional analysis in regulation of land use. Cf. City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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In this view, the conjoined twins of “due process” and “takings,”
both contained within the same sentence of the Fifth Amendment,
would serve as conceptual limits to government power, but a limit that
would be sparingly invoked by the courts. Although specialized cases
of takings (particularly actions that approach exercise of eminent
domain power) might be subject to a more searching takings analysis,
courts would largely defer to legislative judgments of fairness in most
cases of regulatory restrictions.
In fact, this sounds like what the court is doing.61 What is different
is that a focus on distributive justice provides a clearer basis than the
Court’s current reliance on an unexplained and unexplainable
balancing act. Further, it does suggest a line of analysis for courts
brave enough to take on concepts of distributive justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
For good or ill, the concept of the Takings Clause as a principle of
distributive justice arises from the Supreme Court’s own statements.
The Supreme Court has made and repeated the claim that the Takings
Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole. “ At a minimum the Court should
be aware of the consequences that follow from such a view.
Viewed through the lens of distributive justice, takings analysis
gains a sharper focus on those factors that are relevant to assessing the
“fairness” of imposing costs on the few to benefit the many. The
logical implication of this view is a takings test which is no more clear
or certain in application than the current muddle. Additionally it
expressly requires the courts to engage in social and philosophical
judgments which many would say are beyond their competence (used
both in the sense of judges’ institutional role and their intelligence).
Perhaps most significantly, it suggests a limited role for the judiciary
in policing the social judgments of legislators and could confine the
Takings Clause, along with the Due Process Clause, to a limited role.

61. The Supreme Court in Kelo v. New London, Conn., 549 U.S. 469
(2005), specifically articulated a general rule of deference to legislative
judgments of “public purpose” in the Fifth Amendment context of eminent
domain.
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